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Abstract 
 
This paper relates to the literature on the possible effect of inflation targeting on fiscal 
discipline in developing countries. In particular, we present empirical evidence to address 
this issue based on the Colombian experience. An empirical analysis to evaluate the 
reputation gains of the central bank on tax capacity use is made. The results indicate that an 
increase in the reputation of the monetary authority can lead to an increased tax effort. 
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1. Introduction 
The search for institutional arrangements to achieve fiscal balance depends to some extent on the 
monetary policy management. In particular, how much the government uses the tax base depends on 
the likelihood of the central bank monetize the public budget deficits. For the inflation targeting, a 
precondition for its success is the fiscal balance. Therefore, the effort of the fiscal authority to not 
compromise the achievement of the inflation target is fundamental. In this context, an important issue 
for the policy makers is whether the inflation targeting can influence the tax effort. The degree of 
commitment of the monetary authority with the inflation target is essential to avoid the fiscal 
dominance problem. Therefore, the achievement of the inflation target over time by the monetary 
authority (gain of reputation) is an important indicator to observe the performance of the inflation 
targeting regime. This paper examines which factors affect the tax effort and, in particular, if the 
reputation of the monetary authority to succeed in achieving the inflation target is relevant. For this, 
are made regressions that take into account the tax effort measures and reputation of the monetary 
authority, as well as another variables that can affect this relationship. Data of the Colombian 
economy are used in this paper based on information extracted from the Central Bank of Colombia 
and the National Bureau of Statistics of Colombia. These data enable the construction of reputation 
indicators (based on the difference between the observed inflation and the inflation target) and tax 
effort index, and the data also allow to build a set of macroeconomic variables used in the literature. 
Several studies have examined the determinants of use of the tax base. A part of the literature is 
focused on analyzing the tax capacity through the sector composition of the economy (e.g. Tait, Gratz 
and Eichengreen, 1979; Tanzi, 1989, 1992b; Stotsky and Woldemariam, 1997). Another part of the 
literature is concerned on assessing the role of the population profile and the informal economy on 
tax revenues (e.g. Ansari, 1982; Teera and Hudson, 2004; Davoodi and Grigorian, 2007). There are 
also studies showing that various socio-cultural and institutional characteristics (honesty, tax morale, 
inequality, property rights, political instability, corruption) affect the commitment of the agents with 
the financing of the public sector (e.g. Torgler, 2005; Gupta , 2007; Bird, Martinez-Vasquez and 
Torgler, 2008; Fenochietto and Pessino, 2013). 
Despite the above literature, there are few studies that analyze the influence of fiscal constraints on 
tax effort. According to Mkandawire (2010) and Feger and Asafu-Adjaye (2014), in Africa the tax 
exemption to companies (revenues constraints) and the colonial past limited the tax capacity. In an 
influential paper, Tanzi (1989, 1992 a, b) shows that the public debt service need is an important 
variable to push tax revenues. Moreover, Brun, Chambas and Guerineau (2008) and Mosley (2015) 
show that there is an important effect of international financial aid on the efficiency of applying taxes. 
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The present study differs from these related studies in several dimensions. A first aspect refers to the 
fact that this study considers the role of the inflation targeting as a fiscal restriction. In particular, can 
be seen what is the impact on tax effort in the absence of fiscal dominance (impossibility of use of 
inflationary tax in the inflation targeting). A second aspect refers to the fact that this study takes into 
account the role that has the public investment, public wages and the payment of interest on public 
debt as explanatory variables of the tax effort. A third aspect relates to the fact that the insertion of 
reputation (achieving the inflation target over the time) in the analysis allows to contribute to the 
literature that evaluates the effect of the central bank's performance on fiscal discipline in emerging 
economies. 
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that in Colombia the tax effort is affected by the 
reputation of monetary policy. Another important result is that in the period under inflation targeting 
in Colombia, implementation of the efficiency of taxes can be classified as high. In other words, there 
is a greater use of the tax base that can be attributed to the fulfillment of the inflation targets by the 
central bank. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology used to measure the 
tax capacity and tax effort. Section 3 presents the methodology used to capture the inflation targeting 
effect on tax effort. Section 4 provides the empirical results and analyzes the effect of reputation on 
tax effort and Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. 
2. Methodology and data 
To analyze the tax effort is necessary observe the changes in the tax capacity. After this, the tax effort 
is built by comparing tax revenues observed with the tax revenues explained by the tax capacity. In 
general, the literature indicates that variables associated with the level of economic development, 
sector composition of the economy and the performance of public institutions are key to explaining 
the tax capacity.1 
According to Lotz and Morss (1970), Chelliah (1971), Teera and Hudson (2004), Davoodi and 
Grigorian (2007), Bird, Martinez-Vasquez and Torgler (2008) the tax base depends on the extent of 
the markets for goods and services. In addition, is recognized that consumer’s purchasing power 
                                                           
1 The seminal works in the literature are Lotz and Morss (1970), Bahl (1971), Tait, Gratz, and Eichengreen 
(1979). For a literature review of the tax capacity measuring, see: Teera and Hudson (2004) and Fenochietto 
and Pessino (2013). 
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serves as a proxy of the willingness to pay taxes. Therefore, a first variable to consider as explanatory 
of the tax capacity is the GDP per capita (GDPPC). 
Such as observed by Lotz and Morss (1970), Bahl (1971), Chelliah (1971), Tanzi (1992b), Teera and 
Hudson (2004), and Davoodi and Grigorian (2007) foreign trade is an important source of tax 
revenues for emerging economies because these economies use taxes on imports as a strategy to 
protect domestic activities. Therefore, a second explanatory variable to measure the tax capacity 
refers to the ratio imports/GDP (IMP). 
The sector composition of economy affects tax revenues. In general, public sector activities are 
funded with taxes collected in large cities where employment is generated by the industrial and 
service sectors. The growth of these sectors is associated with a lower share of agriculture in the GDP. 
As Davoodi and Gregorian (2007) show, the share of agriculture in the economy affects tax revenues 
since agriculture does not generate a large economic surplus. Therefore, a third explanatory variable 
to measure the tax capacity refers to the share of agriculture in GDP (AGRI). 
According to Perilla (2010), Lopez et al. (2013) and Villar and Forero (2014) in some emerging 
economies such as Colombia, the oil sector share in the economy is a relevant source of fiscal revenue. 
Therefore, as a fourth explanatory variable of the tax capacity is considered the price of oil (OIL). 
One of the tax collection problems in emerging economies is due to the fact that the agents do not 
have incentives to pay taxes. According to Tanzi (1992a), Torgler (2005), Bird, Martinez-Vasquez 
and Torgler (2008), Sookram and Saridakis (2009), and Cyan, Martinez-Vasquez and Vulovic (2013) 
when the fiscal authorities does not have commitment with  the public services quality produced, 
arises a tax evasion tendency. One way to capture the public sector efficiency can be made through 
the resources allocated to investments. The largest investment affects the payer perception on the 
performance of the public sector and increases the tax morale. Thus, another explanatory variable of 
tax capacity considered in this study is the ratio public investment/GDP (PUBINV). 
Hence, to analyze the tax capacity are considered the variables: GDPPC and IMP (economic 
development), AGRI and OIL (sector composition), and the PUBINV (institutional quality). Thus, the 
basic model to analyze the tax capacity is as follows:2 
𝑇𝐴𝑋௧ = 𝛽଴ +𝛽ଵ𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶௧ିଵ + 𝛽ଶ𝐼𝑀𝑃௧ିଵ + 𝛽ଷ𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐼௧ିଵ + 𝛽ସ𝑂𝐼𝐿௧ିଵ+𝛽ହ𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑉௧ିଵ + 𝜀௧ [1] 
                                                           
2 As Feger and Asafu-Adjaye (2014), the variables were lagged one period to eliminate potential endogeneity, 
specification, and simultaneity problems. 
5 
 
As Teera and Hudson (2004), Bird, Martinez-Vasquez and Torgler (2008), Fenochietto and Pessinus 
(2013), and Feger and Asafu-Adjaye (2014), the difference between observed tax revenue and the 
estimated tax revenue is explained by efficiency that shows the tax authority in the use of tax base. 
The tax effort index is derived as the ratio of the actual tax revenue relative to the tax capacity: 
𝑇𝐸௧ =
்஺௑೟
்஺௑೟෣
           [2] 
That is 𝑇𝐴𝑋௧෣  is the ratio of tax/GDP would be recorded given the characteristics of the economy 
(level of economic development, sector composition and institutional quality). So, the tax effort is an 
indicator of fiscal performance because it measures how much the government uses the tax burden.3 
The tax effort index can vary according to the different specifications that can be used to estimate the 
tax capacity. Taking like a reference the procedure adopted by Mkandawire (2010) and Feger and 
Asafu-Adjaye (2014), to eliminate the above problem, the model used in this study was selected for 
having the best statistical performance: greater significance in the parameters, most F-statistic, and 
largest R2 adjusted.  
In order to observe what is the existing specification in the literature on tax capacity that provides the 
best fit for Colombian economy, the selected model was compared with another specifications. 
Proposals considered employ many variables related to those considered in the basic model. For 
example, the models of Bahl (1971), Chelliah (1971) and Tait et al. (1979), and Stotsky and 
Woldemariam (1997) use the participation of the mining sector in GDP (MIN), the share of industry 
in GDP (IND) and the share of foreign trade in GDP (XM) to analyze the influence of sector 
composition of the economy on tax revenues. There are also studies that consider population 
variables. For example, Teera et al. (2004) and Mkandawire (2010) use the population growth rate 
(POP) and the urbanization degree (URB). Finally, in order to verify the effects of institutional quality 
on tax capacity, some studies use the size of the informal sector in the economy (INFORMAL) and 
the debt/GDP ratio (DEBTEXT) (see, for example, Stotsky and Woldemariam, 1997; Bird et al., 2008; 
Mkandawire, 2010). The results of estimation of specifications that are in the empirical literature are 
presented in conjunction with the estimation of the basic model proposed (equation (1)). In general, 
the variables listed in the empirical literature are of little statistical significance to estimate the tax 
capacity in the Colombian case. Moreover, the tax effort behavior is not significantly changed. 
                                                           
3 The tax effort indices are complementary indicators  to the concept of tax burden. See empirical applications 
in: Teera and Hudson (2004), Bird, Martinez-Vasquez and Torgler (2008), Mkandawire (2010), and Feger and 
Asafu-Adjaye (2014). 
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3. Inflation targeting reputation and tax effort 
The persistent inflation in emerging economies causes disincentives in public sector management and 
deteriorates the effectiveness of tax collection. Studies of Tanzi (1989, 1992b) provide evidence that 
the tax collection is a fiscal variable affected by past inflation and by indexation degree of the 
economy. In this context, the inflation targeting is relevant because the fiscal authority is unable to 
make use of seigniorage revenues (inflationary tax).4 
According to Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) is observed that inflation 
persistence has been associated with lack of systematic commitment to fighting inflation and, as a 
result, to a government reputation loss due to non-compliance with the agreements previously signed 
with the society. Furthermore, the reputation in the inflation targeting regime refers to the 
achievement of the objectives announced by the central bank. Thus the reputation of the central bank 
(backward-looking measure) can be used as an element to observe the effect of the central bank's 
performance on tax effort. 
In developing countries reputation can be essential for developing credibility. According to de 
Mendonça (2007) and de Mendonça and de Guimarães e Souza (2009) a high operational credibility 
of inflation targeting is a result of the central bank proving its competence in achieving the inflation 
target. Therefore, the reputation of the central bank under inflation targeting can be measured by the 
difference between observed inflation and the inflation target announced by the central bank. Among 
several indices that measure reputation, the index proposed by de Mendonça and de Guimarães e 
Souza (2009), and de Mendonça and Galveas (2013) is particularly useful for this study because it 
fits well in the case of developing countries that have adopted inflation targeting.  In this sense, 
reputation is maximum (REPUT is equal to 1) when the observed inflation (𝐼𝑁𝐹௧) is equal to the 
inflation target (𝐼𝑁𝐹௧∗). When the observed inflation exceeds the limits of the tolerance interval, the 
REPUT is equal to 0. Because there is the limit of tolerance interval inflation fixed by the monetary 
authority, the index considers the minimum (𝐼𝑁𝐹௧௟௢௪௘௥) and maximum limits (𝐼𝑁𝐹௧௨௣௣௘௥) for the 
inflation target each year. So, the reputation index decreases in a linear fashion as observed inflation 
deviates from this target. As a consequence, the scale of the REPUT is from 0 to 1. Therefore, REPUT 
is a result of: 
                                                           
4 See, for example, Minea and Villieu (2009), Lucotte (2012), Nolivos and Vuletin (2014), and Minea and 
Tapsoba (2014). 
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The behavior of the variables essential for building the reputation index (observed inflation, tolerance 
intervals, and inflation target) after the adoption of inflation targeting in Colombia is shown in Figure 
1. Is possible note that the observed inflation is near the upper limit of the tolerance interval for the 
inflation during most of the period between 2004 and 2006. For the period between 2007 and 2009, 
observed inflation has exceeded the tolerance interval for inflation. After this period, observed 
inflation started to approach the central inflation target. 
Figure 1 
Observed inflation, tolerance intervals, and inflation targets 
 
Sourcce of data: Central Bank of Colombia (see table A.1 – appendix). 
Figure 2 shows the performance of reputation from 2004 to 2014 in Colombia. As expected, to the 
extent that the bank started to reach the inflation target's reputation showed an increase (2004-2006). 
However, from late 2006 the observed inflation crossed the tolerance intervals and the reputation 
went into a downward phase (index equal to zero between 2008 and mid-2009). The period 2010-
2012 shows reputation gains and therefore indicates greater efficiency of monetary policy to keep 
inflation within the tolerance range. Nevertheless, the reputation gains began to fall again since 2013 
due to the fact that observed inflation was below the tolerance intervals, but after rebounded in 2014. 
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Figure 2 
Reputation index 
 
In short, to observe the effect of the central bank's performance on tax effort, the following model is 
considered: 
𝑇𝐸௧ = 𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑇௧ + 𝛼ଶ𝑋௜ + 𝑢௧        [4] 
Where TE is the tax effort, REPUT is the reputation index, Xi is a vector of explanatory variables and 
ut is the residual term. The vector of control variables used are macroeconomic variables associated 
with the public sector in order to see if there are other determinants beyond monetary policy that may 
affect the tax effort. As shown by Tanzi (1989) and Torgler (2005), public employees should be 
stimulated in order to promote tax morale. Thus, a first control variable that affects the tax effort are 
the wages in the public sector (WAGE). The human capital formation of a country is important to 
collecting taxes. According to Torgler (2005), Cyan, Martinez-Vasquez, e Vulovic (2013), e 
Fenochietto e Pessino (2013), a society with over education, have greater capacity to design strategies 
to persuade the payment of taxes. So, government expenditure on education/GDP ratio (EDUC) is 
another variable inserted into the model to explain the tax effort. A measure of the necessity for the 
fiscal authorities to seek revenue is the public debt service (see, for example, Teera and Hudson, 
2004; Brun, Chambas, and Guerineau, 2008). Therefore, a third control variable considered is the 
service of the public debt (DEBT). 
In order to calculate the tax capacity and tax effort, the equations (1) and (4) are estimated through 
two approaches: Ordinary Least Squares with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation covariance 
matrix estimators (HAC), and one-step Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) with HAC (see 
Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004). As pointed out by Greene (1993), the main reason for using GMM 
is that although the OLS estimator is useful, it is not reliable in the presence of serial autocorrelation, 
heteroskedasticity, or nonlinearity (tests in appendix – table A.4). Furthermore, there may be 
0.0
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endogeneity problems in the proposed models that invalidate the estimates through the OLS. To deal 
with the endogeneity problem, the instrumental variables used in the GMM  estimations should be 
exogenous. So, the chosen instrumental variables were lagged at least one period in order to help 
predict the corresponding contemporary variables. As Wooldridge (2001), for efficient estimation 
with GMM are necessary overidentifying restrictions. Therefore, the J-test was applied (see, Hansen, 
1982).5 
Taking into account the information available from Central Bank of Colombia and National Bureau 
of Statistics of Colombia , the data in this study has monthly frequency for the period from January 
of 2004 to December of 2014 (descriptive statistics are presented in table A.2 – appendix). Our 
analysis begins in 2004 because this is when Central Bank of Colombia starts to provide information 
regarding tolerance intervals (essential data for building the reputation index). As usual, the use of 
time series data in estimations entails checking whether the series have a unit root (non-stationary 
data series) to avoid the possibility of spurious regression. Therefore, the Augmented Dickey–Fuller 
(ADF), Phillips-Perron (PP), and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests are performed. 
The series I(0) are considered levels and the series I(1) are used in first differences (see table A.3 – 
appendix).  
4. Empirical results 
The purpose of this section is to present empirical evidences regarding the estimation of tax capacity 
and the tax effort performance. In the first section is estimated the tax capacity. In the second 
subsection is built the tax effort taking into account the estimates of tax capacity. The third subsection 
presents the empirical analysis to check if the reputation of the monetary authority, such as a 
performance measure in achieving the inflation target, is important to explain the tax effort. The 
fourth subsection realizes robustness tests. Finally, in the fifth subsection is ranked the tax effort 
between low, medium and high in order to assess the efficiency of taxing by the fiscal authority during 
the period under inflation targeting. 
4.1. Estimation of tax capacity 
The main purpose of this section is to use the variables associated with the Colombian economy 
structure to estimate the ratio of tax/GDP. The results of the basic model estimation, equation (1), and 
other models that are in the empirical literature (models (2) - (6)) are shown in Table 1. 
                                                           
5 To eliminate any possibility of skewing the results, the number of instruments/number of observations ratio 
is lower than 0.18 in all GMM estimations (list of GMM instruments is available on table A.5– appendix). 
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Table 1 
Estimates of the tax capacity (OLS-HAC e GMM) 
 
 
 
Dep. Variable 
𝑻𝑨𝑿𝒕 
Model (1) 
Bahl (1971), Chelliah 
(1971), Tait et al. (1979)  
Model (2) 
Stotsky and WoldeMariam 
(1997)  
Model (3) 
Teera and Hudson (2004), 
Mkandawire (2010)  
Model (4) 
Davoodi and Grigorian (2007) 
 
 Model (5) 
Bird, Martinez-Vasquez, and 
Torgler (2008)  
Model (6) 
OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM 
Constant 0.0588*** 
(0.0134) 
0.0645*** 
(0.0172) 
0.1000*** 
(0.0147) 
0.1116*** 
(0.0230) 
0.0990*** 
(0.0142) 
0.1024*** 
(0.0162) 
0.1055*** 
(0.0342) 
0.1184*** 
(0.0229) 
0.1064*** 
(0.0179) 
0.1134*** 
(0.0232) 
0.1032*** 
(0.0286) 
0.1206*** 
(0.0251) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶௧ିଵ 3.56E-09 
 (4.95E-08) 
1.31E-08 
(7.16E-08) 
1.37E-07 
 (9.51E-08) 
9.26E-08 
 (9.18E-08) 
1.41E-07 
(9.51E-08) 
7.41E-08 
(6.06E-08) 
1.52E-07 
 (1.07E-07) 
1.15E-07 
 (1.07E-07) 
1.32E-07 
 (1.13E-07) 
4.75E-08 
 (8.38E-08) 
1.52E-07 
 (1.25E-07) 
9.67E-08 
 (1.12E-07) 
𝐼𝑀𝑃௧ିଵ 0.3036*** 
 (0.0678) 
0.2912*** 
(0.0864) 
          
𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐼௧ିଵ -5.9591*** 
(1.8481) 
-7.5612*** 
(2.7870) 
-5.5438 
 (4.1489) 
-6.6589* 
 (3.7050) 
-5.4844 
 (4.2119) 
-5.7956** 
 (2.6855) 
-4.6896 
 (3.8796) 
-1.0690 
 (2.4614) 
-4.2520 
 (3.7551) 
-0.7303 
 (1.9801) 
  
𝑂𝐼𝐿௧ିଵ 0.3036*** 
 (0.0678) 
0.00011** 
(5.37E-06) 
          
𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑉௧ିଵ 0.9727** 
(0.3908) 
1.2213** 
(0.4740) 
          
𝑀𝐼𝑁௧ିଵ   -0.6900 
(0.7514) 
-0.6685 
(0.5874) 
-0.6440 
(0.7865) 
-0.4662 
(0.4204) 
      
𝐼𝑁𝐷௧ିଵ     -0.5537 
(1.0238) 
-0.8848 
(0.6335) 
-1.3400 
(0.8771) 
-2.0338 
(1.2338) 
  -0.9258 
(0.8902) 
-1.0869 
(0.7119) 
𝑋𝑀௧ିଵ   0.0950** 
(0.0471) 
0.0612 
(0.0818) 
0.0976** 
(0.0475) 
0.0919* 
(0.0552) 
0.0924 
(0.0601) 
0.1208** 
(0.0567) 
0.0877* 
(0.0477) 
0.0915 
(0.0705) 
0.1163* 
(0.0667) 
0.1191* 
(0.0643) 
𝑁𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐼௧ିଵ           0.5854 
 (0.9564) 
0.0875 
 (0.5450) 
𝑈𝑅𝐵௧ିଵ         -24.056 
(56.390) 
-51.371* 
(26.939) 
  
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝐿௧ିଵ       0.1229 
(0.5343) 
-0.2603 
(0.2647) 
0.0879 
(0.4621) 
-0.0733 
(0.2653) 
  
𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐸𝑋𝑇௧ିଵ       0.1879 
(0.1724) 
0.1655 
(0.3262) 
    
𝑃𝑂𝑃௧ିଵ 
 
 
Rୟୢ୨ଶ  
F-statistic 
Prob(F-Stat) 
J-statistic 
Prob(J-stat) 
N. Instr./N. Obs. 
 
0.33 
14.07 
0.00 
 
 
 
 
0.31 
 
 
11.08 
0.43 
0.12 
0.17 
7.79 
0.00 
 
 
 
0.15 
 
 
6.39 
0.38 
0.08 
0.17 
6.42 
0.00 
 
 
 
0.15 
 
 
6.67 
0.57 
0.10 
-1.25E-07 
(8.97E-07) 
0.16 
4.63 
0.00 
 
 
 
-5.71E-07* 
(3.29E-07) 
0.10 
 
 
11.11 
0.60 
0.15 
 
 
0.18 
6.99 
0.00 
 
 
 
 
 
0.15 
 
 
10.41 
0.57 
0.13 
-2.16E-07 
(7.82E-07) 
0.13 
4.93 
0.00 
 
 
 
-5.85E-07** 
(2.77E-07) 
0.11 
 
 
10.32 
0.50 
0.12 
Note: Marginal significance levels: (***) denotes 0.01, (**) denotes 0.05, and (*) denotes 0.10. Robust (Newey-West) standard errors are in parentheses and t-statistics in brackets. P(Fstat) 
report the respective p-value of the F-test. P(J-statistic) report the respective p-value of the J-test. 
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The results presented in Table 1 suggest that in the case of Colombia changes the tax capacity are 
explained by the sector composition (agriculture and oil price), institutional quality (public 
investment), and the ratio imports/GDP.  As the results in Table 1, the parameter associated with the 
GDP per capita is not statistically significant in the estimations. Therefore, the tax capacity in 
Colombia is not explained by the performance of GDP per capita. Similar results are found by 
Junguito and Rincon (2004) and OECD (2015). It is found that the parameter associated with the 
share of agriculture in GDP is negative and has statistical significance at 1% only in the estimates of 
the basic model. Thus, there is empirical evidence that the changes in the share of agriculture in GDP 
relate inversely with the tax capacity. The agricultural sector is a subsistence sector without economic 
surplus and therefore the revenues from agriculture are low.6 Moreover, as Bird, Martinez-Vasquez 
and Torgler (2008), in emerging economies the agricultural sector exerts political pressure not to pay 
taxes. In short, the hypothesis that the tax capacity is affected by the loss of economic importance of 
the agricultural sector is confirmed. The results also show that the performance of another different 
sectors of agriculture (mining, industry and non-agricultural sector) are not important to explain the 
tax capacity. 
For the basic model, the signal associated with the parameter of the ratio imports/GDP is positive and 
has statistical significance (see Table 1). As shown Davoodi and Gregorian (2007) and Gupta (2007), 
taxes on foreign trade are an alternative for the emerging economies seeking tax revenues because 
the foreign trade is centralized and can be monitored with lower costs by the fiscal authorities.  
The oil price is important to analyze the tax revenues in Colombia. As can be seen in the estimates 
shown in Table 1, the parameter associated with the oil price is positive and has statistical 
significance. As suggested by Lopez et al. (2013) and Villar and Forero (2014) there are indications 
that the revenue generated by rising oil prices affect positively the public budget. Finally, the 
parameter associated with public investment is positive and has statistical significance (see Table 1). 
Thus, in the same direction which is observed by Bird, Martinez-Vasquez and Torgler (2008) and 
Fenochietto and Pessino (2013), the results indicate that institutional improvements represented by 
public investments allow an increase in tax collection and, therefore, a higher tax capacity. 
The results also show that the parameters of the other measures of institutional quality, as the 
debt/GDP ratio and the informal sector are not significant in statistical terms to estimate the tax 
capacity (see Table 1). In addition, the parameters of the variables that measure the population growth 
rate and urbanization degree are not significant in statistical terms. The results of the regressions 
                                                           
6 Similar results for the recent period are found Fenochietto and Pessino (2013). 
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performed with the OLS and GMM methods (see Table 1) indicate that the coefficient of 
determination is low. Therefore, this suggests that the tax effort may be relevant to explain the 
changes in the ratio tax/GDP. 
4.2. Construction of the tax effort 
This section aims to build the tax effort with the estimates presented in Table 1. In order to obtain the 
tax effort, the tax/GDP estimated by OLS was used, since there is no significant difference in the ratio 
tax/GDP estimated by the OLS and GMM. Once constructed the 𝑇𝐴𝑋௧෣  variable, the tax effort was 
calculated from equation (2). As can be seen in Figure 3, the different measures of tax effort are 
similar. In other words, the specification used to estimate the tax capacity does not change 
significantly the tax effort behavior for the Colombian economy. 
Figure 3 
Tax effort with different specifications  
 
Taking into account the results of the estimates presented in Table 1, the tax effort built by the basic 
model (model (1)) is used by have best statistical performance: greater significance in the parameters, 
greater statistical F and higher adjusted R2 (see table 1). 
4.3. The inflation targeting effect on tax effort 
This section aims to present empirical evidence of the reputation, as a monetary policy performance 
measure under inflation targeting, affects the tax effort. The Table 2 presents the results for estimates 
of OLS and GMM for the model of equation (4). 
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Table 2  
Tax effort estimates with model (1) - OLS and GMM 
Dep. Variable 𝑻𝑬𝒕 
OLS estimates GMM estimates 
Esp. (1) Esp. (2) Esp. (3) Esp. (4) Esp. (5) Esp. (1) Esp. (2) Esp. (3) Esp. (4) Esp. (5) 
Constant 0.9816*** 
(0.0094) 
[103.43] 
0.6549*** 
(0.1122) 
[5.8331] 
0.7475*** 
(0.0840) 
[8.8987] 
0.8132*** 
(0.0497) 
[16.341] 
0.2188 
(0.1565) 
[1.3972] 
0.9801*** 
(0.0121) 
[80.927] 
0.6563*** 
(0.1356) 
[4.8395] 
0.7213*** 
(0.1025) 
[7.0349] 
0.8289*** 
(0.0441) 
[18.7883] 
0.2509* 
(0.1331) 
[1.8838] 
𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑇௧   0.0613** 
(0.0251) 
[2.4331] 
0.0724*** 
(0.0250) 
[2.8974] 
0.0592** 
(0.0247) 
[2.3959] 
0.0804*** 
(0.0249) 
[3.2264] 
0.0892*** 
(0.0239) 
[3.7276] 
0.0633** 
(0.0300) 
[2.1079] 
0.0775** 
(0.0308) 
[2.5168] 
0.0549** 
(0.0273) 
[2.0082] 
0.0688** 
(0.0301) 
[2.2851] 
0.0812** 
(0.0317) 
[2.5602] 
𝑊𝐴𝐺𝐸௧ିସ  0.0030*** 
(0.0010) 
[2.9330] 
  0.0029*** 
(0.0011) 
[2.6336] 
 0.0029** 
(0.0012) 
[2.4126] 
  0.0022** 
(0.0008) 
[2.6117] 
𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶௧ି଺   9.9022*** 
(3.4971) 
[2.8315] 
 13.060*** 
(3.3842) 
[3.8590] 
  11.1886*** 
(4.2328) 
[2.6433] 
 11.995*** 
(3.6403) 
[3.2950] 
𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇௧ି଻    57.290*** 
(16.382) 
[3.4971] 
44.125*** 
(16.684) 
[2.6447] 
   51.8932*** 
(14.703) 
[3.5294] 
68.510** 
(31.145) 
[2.1996] 
 
 
Rୟୢ୨ଶ  
F-statistic 
Prob(F-Stat) 
J-statistic 
Prob(J-stat) 
N. Instr./N. Obs. 
 
 
0.04 
5.92 
0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
0.08 
7.19 
0.00 
 
 
 
 
 
0.08 
6.84 
0.00 
 
 
 
 
 
0.11 
8.84 
0.00 
 
 
 
 
 
0.21 
9.42 
0.00 
 
 
 
 
0.03 
 
 
6.27 
0.28 
0.05 
 
0.07 
 
 
5.05 
0.28 
0.05 
 
0.09 
 
 
5.52 
0.59 
0.07 
 
0.10 
 
 
6.65 
0.24 
0.06 
 
0.19 
 
 
4.76 
0.57 
0.08 
Note: Marginal significance levels: (***) denotes 0.01, (**) denotes 0.05, and (*) denotes 0.10. Robust (Newey-West) standard errors are in parentheses and t-statistics in brackets. 
P(Fstat) report the respective p-value of the F-test. P(J-statistic) report the respective p-value of the J-test. 
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The estimation results presented in Table 2 show the expected behavior from the theoretical 
perspective. There is a positive relationship between the reputation and the effort in all estimated 
models. Therefore, this is evidence that better performance of the central bank in achieving the 
announced inflation target brings as result a better use of tax capacity. In general, the reputation gains 
of monetary policy increases the tax effort for two reasons. The first reason is that reputation gains of 
the central bank as a result of price stabilization causes the government values its tax revenues because 
there is a loss of revenue from the inflation tax (see, Lucotte, 2012; Minea and Tapsoba, 2014). The 
second reason is that when inflation is outside the ranges of tolerance (loss of reputation), the central 
bank must make increases in interest rates to control inflationary pressure. As the inflation is anchored 
(reputation gains), the government is obliged to make a greater tax effort to avoid default risk due to 
the increase in debt service caused by the inflation fighting. So, the inflation control implies an 
increase in the primary surplus to reduce the debt burden.7  
As the results show (see Table 2), the signs of the coefficients of the control variables used in the 
models have the expected behavior. The parameter associated with the public sector wages is positive 
and is statistically significant. As is pointed out by Tanzi (1989) and Torgler (2005), a higher salary 
in the public sector provides an incentive to improve revenue administration and as a result there is a 
greater tax effort. The parameter associated with government expenditure on education is positive 
and has statistical significance. Thus, just as is observed by Fenochietto and Pessino (2013), human 
capital can have a positive influence on tax collection, both because of the improvement in the 
administration of the institutions of government, like by the positive effects it brings on the 
willingness to pay taxes. Finally, it is noted that the parameter associated with the public debt service 
is positive and statistically significant at the 1% (see Table 2). A possible explanation for this result 
is that an increase in debt service leads to a fiscal deterioration that require the search for increased 
tax revenue (see, Tanzi, 1992a, b; Brun, Chambas, and Guerineau, 2008).  
 
4.4. Robustness 
With reference to the procedure adopted by Feger and Asafu-Adjaye (2014), the previous results 
underwent to robustness tests. Aiming to verify if the results do not depend of the model used to 
estimate the tax capacity, the different measures of tax effort presented in Figure 5 were used. The 
tax effort measures used refer to the models (2) - (6), and were constructed from the results of OLS 
                                                           
7 This phenomenon is known as the unpleasant fiscal arithmetic. See Blanchard (2004) and de Mendonça and 
Silva (2009). 
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estimates shown in Table 1. By the same procedure adopted in the previous section (section 4.3 the 
model that incorporates all the explanatory variables is estimated to present better statistical 
performances: greater significance in the parameters, greater statistical F and higher adjusted R2 (see 
table 2, Esp. 5).  
As can be seen in Table 3, the different measures of tax effort not change the empirical evidence 
presented in the previous section. The parameter associated with reputation has positive sign and 
retains statistical significance. Thus, the scope of the inflation targets by the central bank always leads 
to a greater use of the tax base, regardless of the form it is calculated the tax capacity. It is also 
observed that the parameters associated with the salary and the public debt service retain their positive 
sign with statistical significance. Therefore, empirical evidence also reinforces the importance of 
improving the working conditions and greeting the public debt service to take advantage of the tax 
base. Finally, despite of conserving the expected signal, the parameter associated with public 
spending on education is not significant in statistical terms. 
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Table 3 
Tax effort estimates with models (2)-(6) - OLS and GMM 
 OLS estimates GMM estimates 
Dep. Variable 𝑻𝑬𝒕 Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Constant 0.3916** 
(0.1862) 
[2.1027] 
0.4272** 
(0.1879) 
[2.2728] 
0.3623 
(0.1814) 
[1.9970] 
0.3716** 
(0.1761) 
[2.1100] 
0.3301* 
(0.1853) 
[1.7813] 
0.2855 
(0.2048) 
[1.3934] 
0.5353*** 
(0.2000) 
[2.6766] 
0.2477 
(0.1819) 
[1.3614] 
-0.1543 
(0.3124) 
[-0.4938] 
0.1428 
(0.2100) 
[0.6800] 
𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑇௧   0.0764*** 
(0.0284) 
[2.6872] 
0.0758*** 
(0.0287) 
[2.6405] 
0.0793*** 
(0.0277) 
[2.8596] 
0.0753*** 
(0.0269) 
[2.7997] 
0.0829*** 
(0.0239) 
[2.9290] 
0.0879** 
(0.0461) 
[1.9160] 
0.0718* 
(0.0404) 
[1.7737] 
0.0881** 
(0.0438) 
[2.0077] 
0.0805** 
(0.0369) 
[2.1774] 
0.0904** 
(0.0450) 
[2.0088] 
𝑊𝐴𝐺𝐸௧ିସ 0.0036*** 
(0.0013) 
[2.7660] 
0.0033** 
(0.0013) 
[2.4735] 
0.0035*** 
(0.0012) 
[2.7745] 
0.0039*** 
(0.0012) 
[3.1264] 
0.0032** 
(0.0013) 
[2.4178] 
0.0039** 
(0.0015) 
[2.5091] 
0.0032*** 
(0.0011) 
[2.8169] 
0.0035*** 
(0.0013) 
[2.6030] 
0.0085*** 
(0.0026) 
[3.2599] 
0.0037* 
(0.0020) 
[1.8450] 
𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶௧ି଺ 3.6830 
(4.0252) 
[0.9149] 
3.8261 
(4.0624) 
[0.9418] 
5.0436 
(3.9213) 
[1.2861] 
3.1667 
(3.8070) 
[0.8318] 
7.2979* 
(4.0053) 
[1.8220] 
1.3214 
(5.1032) 
[0.2589] 
-0.8455 
(5.4098) 
[-0.1563] 
5.5470 
(4.4661) 
[1.2420] 
7.3309* 
(4.1909) 
[1.7492] 
7.5673* 
(4.4484) 
[1.7011] 
𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇௧ି଻ 35.8805* 
(19.844) 
[1.8081] 
35.767* 
(20.027) 
[1.7858] 
37.857* 
(19.331) 
[1.9583] 
37.948** 
(18.768) 
[2.0219] 
44.9057** 
(19.7463) 
[2.2741] 
77.619** 
(36.864) 
[2.1055] 
39.304* 
(21.993) 
[1.7871] 
71.349* 
(37.547) 
[1.9002] 
11.422 
(24.401) 
[0.4680] 
85.553** 
(39.062) 
[2.1901] 
 
Rୟୢ୨ଶ  
F-statistic 
Prob(F-Stat) 
J-statistic 
Prob(J-stat) 
N. Instr./N. Obs. 
0.10 
4.82 
0.00 
 
 
 
0.09 
4.27 
0.00 
 
 
 
0.12 
5.24 
0.00 
 
 
 
0.13 
5.91 
0.00 
 
 
 
0.12 
5.41 
0.00 
 
 
 
0.07 
 
 
2.09 
0.35 
0.05 
0.08 
 
 
0.48 
0.78 
0.05 
0.07 
 
 
1.79 
0.77 
0.06 
0.06 
 
 
0.50 
0.91 
0.06 
0.06 
 
 
0.58 
0.44 
0.04 
Note: Marginal significance levels: (***) denotes 0.01, (**) denotes 0.05, and (*) denotes 0.10. Robust (Newey-West) standard errors are in parentheses and t-statistics in brackets. 
P(Fstat) report the respective p-value of the F-test. P(J-statistic) report the respective p-value of the J-test. 
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Taking into account the different measures of tax effort (models (1)-(6)), we extend our analysis 
providing new empirical evidence of the effect of reputation on tax effort through a Vector Auto 
Regressive (VAR) model. As usual, the dynamic analysis of VAR is made through impulse response 
functions because it allows one to observe the impulse on the reputation index caused by shocks (or 
innovations) provoked by residual variables over time. As suggested by Koop, Pesaran, and Potter 
(1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998), we make use of the generalized impulse response function 
(impulse responses are invariant to any re-ordering of the variables in the VAR).  
Figure 4 shows the results of the generalized impulse-response functions and are plotted out to the 
12th month.8 The several graphs suggest that an unexpected positive shock on reputation provokes a 
significant increase in the tax effort that abides over time. In brief, the gain of reputation due to the 
success in achieving the inflation target help improve the use of the tax base.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
8 All VARs are order 2 based on Akaike criterion. Furthermore, all VAR satisfy the stability condition. Tests 
are available from the authors on request. 
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Figure 4  
Accumulate response to generalized one s.d. innovations ±2 S.E. 
 
4.5. Efficiency in the use of the tax base 
The purpose of this section is to evaluate the changes in application efficiency of taxes on their tax 
base under inflation targeting. Thus, the tax effort is classified for years and is made a comparison 
between the ratio tax/GDP ratio observed with the tax/GDP estimated. Due to the use of monthly 
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data, the tax efficiency for each specific year was calculated with the final month data (accumulated 
tax effort). 
As Tait, Gratz and Eichengreen (1979), Piancastelli (2001), and Feger and Asafu-Adjaye (2014) the 
tax effort can be ranked among high (TE>1), medium (0.84<TE≤1) or low (TE≤0.84). In Table 4 are 
shown the cumulative results for 2004 to 2014. 
Table 4 
Tax effort in Colombia 
Year Tax effort Classification 
2004 0.95 medium 
2005 1.03 high 
2006 1.06 high 
2007 1.02 high 
2008 1.02 high 
2009 1.04 high 
2010 1.08 high 
2011 
2012 
0.98 
0.97 
medium 
medium 
2013 0.93 medium 
2014 1.05 high 
mean 2004-2014 1.01 high 
 
By the results of Table 4, in the period 2004 to 2014 the tax effort was high (average 1.01). Since the 
reporting period corresponds to the period under inflation targeting, there is evidence that the fight 
against inflation by the central bank is associated with an improvement in the use of the tax base. 
Based on the procedure adopted by Davoodi and Gregorian (2007), in the Figure 5 is presented the 
tax/GDP ratio observed and the tax/GDP ratio estimated for the end of each year in the period 2004-
2014 based on the basic model estimates.  It is observed that the tax effort was high between 2005-
2010 because the tax/GDP ratio observed was higher than the tax/GDP ratio estimated. The 2005-
2010 period also coincides with a significant disinflationary process of the Colombian economy 
toward long-term inflation target of the central bank (5.5% in January 2005 to 3% in January 2010, 
see Figure 1). So, the period 2005-2010 shows a high tax effort combined with a strong central bank's 
effort to fight inflation. In the period 2011-2013, the tax/GDP ratio estimated was above of the 
tax/GDP ratio observed indicating that the tax effort declined. However, the tax effort still ranks as 
average in 2013. Finally, in 2014 the tax effort was again ranked as high. In short, there is evidence 
that the tax effort does not rank as low in the period analyzed.  
Figure 5  
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Tax/GDP ratio observed and tax/GDP ratio estimated 
 
 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Based on data from Colombia, this study examined the use of tax capacity. In particular, it was 
considered as the tax effort is affected by the reputation of the central bank under inflation targeting. 
The tax effort and reputational measures were built, as were also taken into account macroeconomic 
variables used in the literature. Through an empirical analysis with regressions, two aspects were 
checked. The first aspect was to verify the importance of tax effort as a determining tax/GDP ratio. 
The second above-mentioned aspect was to evaluate the importance of reputation to explain the tax 
effort.  
The results suggest that the central bank success in achieving the announced inflation target causes 
better use of the tax base. It was also noted that there is a high efficiency in the application of taxes 
during the period under inflation targeting in Colombia. In particular, the results of this study help to 
understand the importance of price stability for the tax revenues management in emerging economies. 
Is important to highlight that the tax effort can be affected by many other factors that cannot be related 
to the reputation of the central bank. For example, the evidence presented in this study also showed 
that the tax effort is affected positively by higher wages in the public sector and, to a lesser extent, by 
human capital improvements. In addition, the need for payment the public debt service encourages 
the use of the tax base.  
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Appendix 
Table A.1  
Sources of data and description of the variables 
Variable Variable description   Data source 
TAX Tax/GDP – seasonal adjustment X12.   Central Bank of Colombia 
(http://www.banrep.gov.co/es/series-
estadisticas/see_finanzas_publi.htm) 
GDPPC 
Gross domestic product per capita – series 
was built on real GDP per capita 
(Colombian currency) 
 Central Bank of Colombia 
(http://www.banrep.gov.co/es/pib) 
IMP Imports/GDP.   
Central Bank of Colombia 
(http://www.banrep.gov.co/es/balanza-
comercial) 
AGRI Agriculture/GDP.   Central Bank of Colombia 
(http://www.banrep.gov.co/es/pib) 
OIL Oil price – West Texas Intermediate (WTI).   
Central Bank of Colombia 
(http://www.banrep.gov.co/es/balanza-
comercial) 
PUBINV Public Investment/GDP – seasonal adjustment X12  
Central Bank of Colombia 
(http://www.banrep.gov.co/es/series-
estadisticas/see_finanzas_publi.htm) 
INF* Inflation target – Central Bank of 
Colombia. 
 http://www.banrep.gov.co/es/meta-inflacion  
INF 
Inflation accumulated in 12 months 
measured by the variation of the consumer 
price index. 
 http://www.banrep.gov.co/es/ipc  
REPUT 
Reputation index. Devised by authors, 
based on de Mendonça and Galveas 
(2013) methodology 
 Central Bank of Colombia 
(http://www.banrep.gov.co/es/ipc) 
EDUC 
Government expenditure on 
education/GDP – seasonal adjustment 
X12 
 
Central Bank of Colombia 
(http://www.banrep.gov.co/es/series-
estadisticas/see_finanzas_publi.htm) 
WAGE 
Public sector wages index  
National Bureau of Statistics of Colombia 
(DANE) 
(http://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/ 
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estadisticas-por-tema/mercado-laboral) 
DEBT Public debt service/GDP – seasonal adjustment X12  
Central Bank of Colombia 
(http://www.banrep.gov.co/es/series-
estadisticas/see_finanzas_publi.htm)  
MIN Mining Industry/GDP  Central Bank of Colombia 
(http://www.banrep.gov.co/es/pib) 
IND Industry/GDP  Central Bank of Colombia 
(http://www.banrep.gov.co/es/pib) 
XM 
Trade openness - total trade (i.e. the sum 
of exports and imports of goods and 
services) relative to GDP 
 
Central Bank of Colombia 
(http://www.banrep.gov.co/es/balanza-
comercial) 
INFORMAL Informal sector (measured by employment in the informal sector/total employment)  
National Bureau of Statistics of Colombia 
(DANE) 
(http://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/ 
estadisticas-por-tema/mercado-laboral) 
URB Urbanization degree  
National Bureau of Statistics of Colombia 
(DANE) 
(http://www.dane.gov.co/)  
POP Population.   
National Bureau of Statistics of Colombia 
(DANE) 
(http://www.dane.gov.co/)  
DEBTEXT External debt/GDP  
Central Bank of Colombia 
(http://www.banrep.gov.co/es/series-
estadisticas/see_finanzas_publi.htm). 
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Table A.2 
Descriptive statistics  
Variables Mean  Median Maximum Minimum Std. dev.  
TAX 0.1323 0.1317 0.1797 0.0945 0.0113 
GDPPC 8845375 8828384 10609031 7329522 890366.7 
IMP 0.1965 0.1956 0.2358 0.1715 0.0133 
AGRI 0.0669 0.0676 0.0811 0.0546 0.0078 
OIL 77.7654 77.3300 133.8800 34.3100 22.3284 
PUBINV 0.0219 0.0278 0.0517 0.0059 0.0089 
REPUT 0.2986 0.2994 0.7111 0.0000 0.2278 
EDUC 0.0237 0.0237 0.0288 0.0197 0.0017 
WAGE 107.4981 107.8775 124.6583 96.2088 5.6402 
DEBT 0.028 0.028 0.040 0.019 0.003 
MIN 0.082 0.079 0.122 0.052 0.020 
IND 0.130 0.131 0.148 0.104 0.012 
XM 0.299 0.298 0.373 0.226 0.029 
INFORMAL 0.509 0.513 0.544 0.480 0.012 
URB 0.752 0.753 0.763 0.740 0.007 
POP 44994439 44978748 47775027 42259425 1686499 
DEBTEXT 0.2027 0.1917 0.3008 0.1510 0.0368 
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Table A.3 
Unit root tests (ADF, PP, and KPSS) 
Series 
ADF PP KPSS 
Lags Esp. I/T C. V (5%) Band I/T. Test 
C.V. 
(5%) Band I/T. Test 
C.V. 
(5%) 
TAX 4 I -3.31 -2.88 4 N -3.40 -2.88 4 I, T 0.09 0.14 
GDPPC 10 I, T -2.40 -3.44 4 I, T -0.70 -3.44 4 I,T 0.21 0.14 
ΔGDPPC 9 N -0.16 -1.94 4 N -3.63 -1.94 4 I 0.26 0.46 
IMPORT 1 I -2.94 -2.88 4 I -1.74 -2.88 9 I 0.29 0.46 
AGRI 11 I -1.48 -2.88 4 I -1.16 -2.88 9 I 1.38 0.46 
ΔAGRI 10 I -4.20 -2.88 35 N -3.37 -1.94 3 I 0.05 0.46 
OIL 1 I -2.93 -2.88 5 N -0.56 -1.94 8 I, T 0.09 0.14 
PUBINV 1 I, T -4.48 -3.44 7 N -1.22 -1.94 9 I 1.21 0.46 
ΔPUBINV 12 I -5.59 -2.88 26 I -3.16 -2.88 7 I 0.11 0.46 
REPUT 2 N -2.76 -1.94 7 N -0.89 -1.94 9 I 0.14 0.46 
WAGE 4 I -3.75 -2.88 4 I -4.25 -2.88 10 I 0.23 0.46 
EDUC 4 I -3.59 -2.88 4 I -3.89 -2.88 9 I, T 0.08 0.14 
DEBT 12 I -3.03 -2.88 37 I -16.93 -2.88 31 I 0.28 0.46 
MIN 4 N -0.18 -1.94 2 N -0.72 -1.94 9 I, T 0.11 0.14 
ΔMIN 3 N -4.16 -1.94 18 N -4.05 -1.94 2 I 0.06 0.46 
XM 1 I -4.92 -2.88 4 I -6.79 -2.88 7 I, T 0.07 0.34 
IND 10 N -2.44 -1.94 16 I, T -2.95 -3.44 8 I, T 0.29 0.14 
ΔIND 12 I -1.86 -2.88 34 I -3.97 -2.88 18 I 0.24 0.56 
NAGRI 4 N -0.36 -1.94 4 N -0.70 -1.94 9 I, T 0.10 0.14 
ΔNAGRI 3 N -4.18 -1.94 17 N -3.61 -1.94 4 I 0.06 0.46 
INFORMAL 10 N -1.37 -1.94 54 N -1.42 -1.94 8 I, T 0.18 0.14 
ΔINFORMAL 9 N -2.87 -1.94 29 N -4.13 -1.94 55 I 0.22 0.46 
DEBTEXT 1 N -0.58 -1.94 2 N -1.68 -1.94 6 I, T 0.31 0.11 
ΔDEBTEXT 0 N -7.81 -1.94 0 N -5.75 -1.94 2 I, T 0.03 0.14 
ΔPOP 1 I -2.36 -2.88 9 I -3.26 -2.88 8 I 0.13 0.46 
ΔURB 3 N 0.80 -1.94 6 N -3.68 -1.94 6 I, T 0.13 0.14 
Note: C.V. = critical value. Trend (T), intercept (I) and none (N) are included based on Schwarz criterion. ADF 
– the final choice of lag was made based on Schwarz criterion. PP and KPSS – spectral estimation method is 
Bartlett kernel and the Newey-West Bandwidth is used. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
Table A.4 
Specification (RESET), Heteroskedasticity (BPG) and autocorrelation (LM) tests model (1) 
Tests F-stat p-value 
Model (1) 
  
LM test (1) 184.08 0.00 
LM test (2) 171.55 0.00 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test 1.88 0.10 
RESET test (1) 0.41 0.67 
Esp. 1 
  
LM test (1) 182.34 0.00 
LM test (2) 169.41 0.00 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test 1.18 0.27 
RESET test (1) 0.09 0.93 
Esp. 2   
LM test (1) 171.74 0.00 
LM test (2) 159.83 0.00 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test 0.55 0.57 
RESET test (1) 0.89 0.37 
Esp. 3   
LM test (1) 180.71 0.00 
LM test (2) 158.39 0.00 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test 1.08 0.34 
RESET test (1) 1.94 0.06 
Esp. 4   
LM test (1) 135.89 0.00 
LM test (2) 110.59 0.00 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test 0.73 0.48 
RESET test (1) 0.17 0.86 
Esp. 5   
LM test (1) 144.47 0.00 
LM test (2) 109.40 0.00 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test 0.68 0.60 
RESET test (1) 0.44 0.65 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
Table A.5 
List of GMM instruments 
Dependent 
Variable Model Instruments 
TAX Model (1) 
TAX₋₁, TAX₋₂, TAX₋₃, TAX₋₄, TAX₋₅, TAX₋₆, ΔGDPPC₋₃, ΔGDPPC₋₄, 
IMPORT₋₅, IMPORT₋₆, ΔAGRI₋₄, ΔAGRI₋₅, ΔAGRI₋₆, ΔPUBINV₋₂, 
ΔPUBINV₋₃, OIL₋₄. 
TAX Model (2) TAX₋₃, TAX₋₄, TAX₋₅, TAX₋₆, ΔGDPPC₋₂, ΔGDPPC₋₃, ΔAGRI₋₄, ΔAGRI₋₅, ΔMIN₋₂, XM₋₂. 
TAX Model (3) TAX₋₃, TAX₋₄, TAX₋₅, TAX₋₆, ΔGDPPC₋₂, ΔAGRI₋₇, ΔMIN₋₂, ΔMIN₋₃,  ΔMIN₋₄, ΔIND₋₂, ΔIND₋₃, XM₋₂, XM₋₃. 
TAX Model (4) 
TAX₋₂, TAX₋₃, TAX₋₄, ΔGDPPC₋₂, ΔGDPPC₋₃, ΔGDPPC₋₄,  ΔAGRI₋₂, 
ΔAGRI₋₃, ΔAGRI₋₄, ΔIND₋₃, XM₋₂, XM₋₃, XM₋₄, ΔINFORMAL₋₂, 
ΔINFORMAL₋₃, ΔINFORMAL₋₄,ΔDEBTEXT₋₂, ΔDEBTEXT₋₃, 
ΔDEBTEXT₋₄, ΔPOP₋₄. 
TAX Model (5) 
TAX₋₂, TAX₋₃, TAX₋₄, ΔGDPPC₋₂, ΔGDPPC₋₃, ΔGDPPC₋₄,  ΔAGRI₋₂, 
ΔAGRI₋₃, ΔAGRI₋₄, XM₋₂, XM₋₃, ΔINFORMAL₋₂, ΔINFORMAL₋₃, 
ΔINFORMAL₋₄,ΔURB₋₂, ΔURB₋₃, ΔURB₋₄. 
TAX Model (6) 
TAX₋₂, TAX₋₃, TAX₋₄, ΔGDPPC₋₂, ΔGDPPC₋₃, ΔNAGRI₋₂, ΔNAGRI₋₃, 
ΔNAGRI₋₄, ΔIND₋₂, ΔIND₋₃, ΔIND₋₄, XM₋₂, XM₋₃, XM₋₄, ΔPOP₋₂, 
ΔPOP₋₃. 
TE Esp. 1 TE₋₄, TE₋₅, REPUT₋₂, REPUT₋₃, REPUT₋₄, REPUT₋₅. 
TE Esp. 2 TE₋₄, TE₋₅, REPUT₋₁, REPUT₋₂, REPUT₋₃, WAGE₋₅. 
TE Esp. 3 TE₋₄, TE₋₅, TE₋₆, REPUT₋₂, REPUT₋₃, EDUC₋₆, EDUC₋₇, EDUC₋₈, WAGE. 
TE Esp. 4 TE₋₃, TE₋₄, TE₋₅, TE₋₆, REPUT₋₁, REPUT₋₂, DEBT₋₇. 
TE Esp. 5 TE₋₃, REPUT₋₁, REPUT₋₂, EDUC₋₇, EDUC₋₈, WAGE₋₄, WAGE₋₅,  WAGE₋₆, DEBT₋₈. 
TE Model (2) TE₋₄, REPUT₋₁, EDUC₋₆, EDUC₋₇, WAGE₋₅, DEBT₋₈. 
TE Model (3) TE₋₃, REPUT₋₂, REPUT₋₃, EDUC₋₇, WAGE₋₄, DEBT₋₇. 
TE Model (4) TE₋₄, TE₋₅, TE₋₆, REPUT₋₁, REPUT₋₂, EDUC₋₆, WAGE₋₅, DEBT₋₈. 
TE Model (5) TE₋₃, REPUT₋₁, REPUT₋₂, EDUC₋₆, EDUC₋₇, WAGE₋₆, DEBT₋₇. 
TE Model (6) TE₋₄, REPUT₋₂, EDUC₋₆, WAGE₋₅, DEBT₋₈. 
 
